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Abstract: Classification shifting is a new approach of earnings management, which 
verifies when there is a deliberate change in the classification of items in the income 
statement for the year, withdrawing items from core earnings and assigning for special 
items. As corporate governance reduces opportunistic behavior of the manager, this 
paper aims to verify the influence of corporate governance in earnings management by 
classification shifting. For this purpose, 236 publicly-traded companies listed in Brasil, 
Bolsa, Balcão (B3) between 2005 and 2016 were analyzed. As a metric for earnings 
management, the classification shifting proposed by McVay (2006) was used, and as 
metrics of corporate governance, the differentiated levels of corporate governance 
provided by B3 were used. findings show that earnings management by classification 
shifting happens in Brazil, and corporate governance, measured by the differentiated 
levels of corporate governance of B3, is a factor that reduces the classification shifting, 
thus, governance is able to change the behavior of the manager. Therefore, corporate 
governance is a relevant attribute for companies vis-à-vis investors, because it ensures 
the trust and transparency of the disclosed information. 
Keywords – Classification Shifting; Earnings Management; Corporate Governance. 
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Resumo: A mudança de classificação é uma nova abordagem de gerenciamento de 
resultados, que verifica quando há uma alteração deliberada na classificação de itens na 
demonstração de resultados do exercício, retirando itens do resultado principal do 
negócio e atribuindo a itens especiais. Como a governança corporativa reduz o 
comportamento oportunista do gestor, este artigo tem como objetivo verificar a 
influência da governança corporativa no gerenciamento de resultados por mudança de 
classificação. Para tanto, foram analisadas 236 companhias abertas listadas na Brasil, 
Bolsa, Balcão (B3) entre 2005 e 2016. Como métrica para o gerenciamento de 
resultados, utilizou-se a mudança de classificação proposta por McVay (2006) e, como 
métricas de governança corporativa, foram utilizados os níveis diferenciados de 
governança corporativa fornecidos pela B3. Os resultados mostram que o gerenciamento 
de resultados por mudança de classificação acontece no Brasil, e que a governança 
corporativa, medida pelos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa de B3, é um 
fator que reduz a mudança de classificação, assim, a governança é capaz de mudar o 
comportamento do gestor. Portanto, a governança corporativa é um atributo relevante 
para as empresas vis-à-vis os investidores, pois garante a confiança e a transparência das 
informações divulgadas. 
Palavras-chave – Mudança de Classificação; Gerenciamento de Resultados; 
Governança Corporativa. 
 
Introduction 
The function of accounting is to provide credible information to investors and stakeholders, so they 
can make assertive decisions. However, managers often use accounting opportunistically by manipulating 
accounting numbers (Scott, 2012). This type of manipulation is called earnings management, which is a 
practice that can be explained by agency theory, since managers could make decisions in their own interest 
instead of maximizing decisions for the benefit of investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to McVay (2006), the literature commonly adopts two concepts of earnings 
management: by accruals and by operational activities. However, the author proposes a new approach of 
earnings management, which verifies when there is a deliberate change in the classification of items in the 
income statement for the year, which is defined as classification shifting. This type of earnings 
management differs from the others because it does not change net income (McVay, 2006). 
According to the literature, managers manipulate results by changing their classification when they 
change, for example, normal expenses as unusual, special, significant, exceptional, abnormal or 
extraordinary items. These items are considered transient, non-persistent and non-recurring. 
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Although the magnitude of the profit is not affected, the misclassification of expenses is misleading 
to users of the financial statements, as different components of the income statement have different 
informational content that is relevant to profitability or profit forecasting. Incorrect classification of 
expenses is misleading to users of the financial statements because different components of the income 
statement have different informational content that is informative for assessing profitability or predicting 
future earnings. 
The large presence of earnings management and the low level of information are characteristic of 
countries with low investor protection (DeFond et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2003), suggesting that, in 
countries such as Brazil, the earnings management by classification shifting could be frequent. In order to 
mitigate this problem, the literature points out that reputation (Cao et al., 2012; Garrett et al., 2014), 
corporate social responsibility (Hong & Andersen, 2011, Kim et al., 2012), culture (Elias, 2004; Hashim, 
2012) and corporate governance (González & García-Meca, 2014; Shen & Chih, 2007) would be factors 
capable of decreasing the managers’ engagement in opportunistic earnings management practices. 
In this sense, corporate governance concentrates practices and mechanisms that aim to decrease 
informational asymmetry, due to conflicts between managers and shareholders or between majority and 
minority shareholders (Wang & Campbell, 2012), which imply a reduction in the cost of capital. In 2000, 
Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3 created differentiated levels of corporate governance - Level 1, Level 2 and 
New Market (Novo Mercado in Portuguese) - in order to ensure equality in the Brazilian capital market 
and to provide greater transparency and trust for investors. For each level, companies are committed to 
comply with certain corporate governance practices, in which New Market is the most demanding level. 
Thus, the companies listed in this level would be those with the best corporate governance practices (Srour, 
2005). 
Therefore, the present study aims to verify the influence of corporate governance in earnings 
management by classification shifting. For this purpose, 236 publicly-traded companies listed in Brasil, 
Bolsa, Balcão - B3 between 2005 and 2016 were analyzed. As a metric for earnings management, the 
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classification shifting proposed by McVay (2006) was used, and as metrics of corporate governance, the 
levels of corporate governance provided by B3 were used (Martinez, 2011). 
Two important findings were obtained with the analysis of the present study. First, it is observed 
that the earnings management by classification shifting happens in Brazil, which corroborates the study 
of Behn et al., (2013), who verified the existence of this type of earnings management in a sample of 40 
countries. Second, it is noticed that corporate governance, measured by the differentiated levels of 
corporate governance of B3, is a factor that reduces the classification shifting, thus, governance is able to 
change the behavior of the manager (Haw et al., 2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2015). In this way, corporate 
governance is a relevant attribute for companies vis-à-vis investors, because it ensures the trust and 
transparency of the disclosed information. 
The main importance of the study is due to the non-existence of Brazilian studies adopting the 
earnings management by classification shifting, considering that, in emerging markets, this practice may 
prove to be prominent. In addition, the earnings management by classification shifting is difficult to detect 
by the auditing and has a significant impact on the interpretation of analysts and the perception of investors 
(Haw et al., 2011). Consequently, identifying factors that mitigate this type of earnings management is 
relevant to the Brazilian capital market. 
In addition, the literature is not conclusive about the relationship between earnings management 
and corporate governance (Cunha & Piccoli, 2017; Erfurth & Bezerra, 2013; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Susanto 
& Pradipta, 2016; Zalata & Roberts, 2015). Largely due to the various metrics used. Thus, demonstrating 
that the differentiated levels of corporate governance of B3 are able to mitigate earnings management is 
pertinent, since it represents a simple metric and easy access to the stakeholders, helping them to make 
precise decisions, as well as showing reliability for such users. 
Literature Review 
Earnings management and corporate governance 
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The relevance of earnings management is due to its potential effect on financial statements, which 
in turn can influence stakeholder decision making (Stolowy & Breton, 2003). This fact occurs because the 
earnings management can modify the perception of investors, making them make erroneous decisions 
from manipulated information. Most of the time, the earnings management is an intentional alteration of 
the accounting earnings in order to meet a particular motivation. In this sense, the management artificially 
manages the earnings for purposes other than those of expressing the latent reality of the business 
(Martinez, 2001). 
According to Healy and Whalen (1998), earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgments during the preparation of financial reports and in the structuring of transactions in order to alter 
the respective financial statements, misleading some stakeholders about the economic performance of firm 
or influencing the contractual results that depend on the accounting numbers reported. 
Earnings management stems from the existence of at least two alternatives for which no accounting 
standard has been enacted (Hendriksen & Van Breda, 1999). Thus, the presentation of financial 
information not consistent with that made by the firm, does not detract from accounting principles (Erfurth 
& Bezerra, 2013). Thus, creative accounting, associated with earnings management (Santos & Grateron, 
2003), is based on the existence of subjectivity, flexibility and omission of accounting standards to present 
earnings as desired by the managers. 
In general, the practice of earnings management implies in the increase or decrease of the earnings 
at the discretion and motivation of the management. In recent times, the most recurrent practice of earnings 
management is by accruals (Mazzioni et al., 2015). 
The engagement in practices of earnings management has different implications, such as 
impressing capital investors, reducing tax debts, improving contract negotiation, allowing good 
management evaluation, among others (Matsumoto & Parreira, 2007). Similarly, motivations are also 
distinct, which include capital market motivations, contractual motivations and regulatory incentives, 
political costs (Matsumoto & Parreira, 2007) and CEO reputation (Godfrey et al., 2003). 
If the firms have higher level of earnings management, then they have lower accounting 
information quality presented in the financial statements (Sunder, 1997). According to McVay (2006), the 
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literature addresses two concepts of earnings management: management by accruals and manipulation by 
operational activities; these concepts aim to modify the company's net income or even cash flow, as the 
manipulation of operational activities, as known as real earnings management, because this manipulation 
is expenses cuts that have an expectation of generating value. 
However, there is the possibility of engaging in earnings management without change net income 
or cash flow, this type of earnings management is known as classification shifting (McVay, 2006). This 
other concept of earnings management is based on the manipulation of informational content, since the 
elements of the income statement are intentionally modified (Haw et al., 2011). 
McVay (2006) states that managers would remove items that make up the core earnings and 
attribute to special items, which are considered temporary or irrelevant. McVay (2006) argues that 
investors, in general, observe core earnings because it represents the actual activity of the firm and is used 
for firm valuation, so investors would be misled by management making wrong decisions because 
informational content of the financial statements was manipulated. 
It is noteworthy that the change of classification occurs under different generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAPs). Most previous research is based on US GAAP and IFRS-based research 
is missing. IFRSs are accounting standards that provide general guidance for the preparation of financial 
statements, with the aim of improving comparability and understandability. However, because of the 
principled characteristic of these standards, managers have much more flexibility in making accounting 
choices that can create opportunities for earnings management. 
Lin and Hwang (2010) emphasize that corporate governance is a factor that is able to minimize the 
practice of earnings management, although there are some inconsistencies about this relationship (García-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). The relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance occurs because corporate governance represents a set of mechanisms that contribute to the 
monitoring the managers (Cunha & Piccoli, 2017), limiting them and/or punishing them in certain 
accounting practices. 
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Corporate governance can be defined as a set of mechanisms in order to ensure to capital providers 
return on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, the mechanisms act as protection to external 
investors in relation to the possibility of expropriation by internal investors (La Porta et al., 1998). 
In addition, corporate governance emerges as a set of control mechanisms that can reduce agency 
costs, arising from conflicts of interest between owners and managers and between majority and minority 
shareholders (Silveira & Barros, 2007), which are part of the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Thus, governance uses ex-ante mechanisms in an attempt to avoid or minimize ex-post costs (Dami et al., 
2007). 
According to the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, 2014, p.19), Instituto 
Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa in Portuguese, governance comprises a “system which companies 
and other organizations are directed, monitored and encouraged” involving a broad set of stakeholders, 
which includes partners, Board of Directors, and other interested parties. Transparency, fairness, 
accountability and corporate responsibility are basic principles for the development of governance 
practices (IBGC, 2014). 
In 2000, the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BM&FBovespa), renamed Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão - B3, 
created the special listing segments known as differentiated levels of corporate governance – New Market, 
Level 2 and Level 1 - in order to highlight to the market the effort made by firms to improve the 
relationship with investors and to raise the valuation potential of their assets (Mazzioni et al., 2015). 
The differentiated levels of corporate governance are aimed to firms whose shares are traded on 
the stock exchange, which voluntarily commit to the adoption of practices beyond what is legally required 
in an attempt to improve the quality of accounting and financial information and to improve the 
relationship between risk and return to investors (Moura et al., 2016). Another objective related to the 
adoption of differentiated levels of corporate governance refers to the reduction of informational 
asymmetry between investors and others stakeholders, due to the expectation of high transparency and 
reduction of the cost of capital (Almeida et al., 2010). 
The literature has shown that corporate governance can improve investors' perception of firm 
performance (Almeida-Santos et al., 2011) and that the best practices of corporate governance can 
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contribute to reliable financial statements, enhancing the share value (Erfurth & Bezerra, 2013). In this 
context, studies have shown that efficient corporate governance mechanisms are able to reduce the practice 
of earnings management (Cunha & Piccoli, 2017, Haw et al., 2011, Lin & Hwang, 2010, Zalata & Roberts, 
2015). 
Hypothesis development 
Previous studies show that corporate governance - as proxy in the absence of CEO duality, 
existence of audit committee, independence of directors, among others - is a factor capable of reducing 
practices of earnings management (Lin & Hwang, 2010). However, this relationship presents 
inconsistencies (García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). 
In the Anglo-Saxon context, which has common law system, corporate governance has a negative 
relationship with earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Iqbal & Strong, 2010; 
Sun et al., 2010; Hazarika et al., 2012; Zalata & Roberts, 2015). Countries with these characteristics have 
high national governance and investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003), contributing to 
a more influential corporate governance. 
In the Asian context - most of countries have the mixed legal system - corporate governance does 
not present a conclusive result regarding the relationship with earnings management. On the one hand, 
some studies show a positive relationship (Chen et al., 2007; Liu & Lu, 2007; Shen & Chih 2007; Lo et 
al., 2010; Wang & Campbell, 2012; Susanto & Pradipta, 2016), while other studies have found a negative 
relationship (Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Siregar & Utama 2008; Haw et al., 2011). 
In the Latin context, which has civil legal system, is also verified that there is inconsistency 
regarding the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. Some studies show 
that corporate governance is able to reduce earnings management (Iturriaga & Hoffmann, 2005; Prencipe 
& Bar-Yosef, 2011; Barros et al., 2013; Gonzalez & García-Meca, 2014; Cunha & Piccoli, 2017). Other 
researches, in turn, have shown inconsistencies, whether due to the use of various metrics for earnings 
management and corporate governance, or by failure to observe consistent results over time (Martinez, 
2011; Erfurth & Bezerra, 2013; Mazzioni et al., 2015). 
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Therefore, the extensive literature has investigated the relationship between earnings management 
and corporate governance. The analysis developed relies on the mechanisms of corporate governance, 
such as structure and concentration of ownership, shareholder identity, board of directors (size, 
independence and activity), CEO duality, CEO turnover, audit quality, among others (González & García-
Meca, 2014; Hazarika et al., 2012; Iqbal & Strong, 2010; Lin &  Hwang, 2010). Each of these corporate 
governance mechanisms has a distinct impact on practices of earnings management. 
The differentiated levels of corporate governance developed by B3 consider aspects such as the 
characteristics of the shares issued, the percentage of shares in free float, the public distribution of shares, 
the composition of the board of directors, the fence to accumulation of positions, financial statements, the 
additional disclosure of information, among others. 
In general, corporate governance mechanisms seek to reduce informational asymmetry and 
opportunistic behaviors by managers, thus improving the quality of accounting information (González & 
García-Meca, 2014; Shen & Chih, 2007). A negative relationship is expected between corporate 
governance and earnings management, because the higher the earnings management the lower the quality 
of accounting information, and corporate governance would act to minimize or retain the opportunistic 
behaviors of managers. The present study, based on the literature, develops the following hypothesis. 
H1: Corporate governance reduces the practice of earnings management by classification shifting. 
Method 
The study sample comprised 236 companies listed in Brasil, Bolsa e Balcão - B3, which correspond 
to those that present information to measure the variables under study, highlighting the existence of small 
variation in sample size due to missing observations depending on the model used. 
The accounting and corporate governance information was obtained from the Compustat Global 
database and from the B3 website for the accounting periods between 2005 and 2016. As the initial period, 
it was considered the year of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) at the 
international level, although Brazil has begun to mandatory adopt IFRS in 2010, this period was used, 
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since the main objective of IFRS is to improve the quality of accounting information (Yip & Young, 
2012), thus, it is controlled by this effect. 
In order to verify the hypothesis, the earnings management by classification shifting was measured 
according to McVay (2006). First, it is used the core earning model to measure the unexpected change in 
core earnings, according to Equation 1. 
 
𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5Δ𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁_Δ𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
The unexpected change in core earnings (UE) represents the difference between the core earnings 
(CE) and the residue (εit) of Equation 1. Table 1 presents the description of the variables presented in 
Equation 1. 
 
Variables Measurement 
Core earnings CE 
(𝑆 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆) − 𝑆𝐺𝐴
𝑆
 
Asset Turnover Ratio ATO 
𝑆
(𝑂𝐴−𝑂𝐿)𝑡− (𝑂𝐴−𝑂𝐿)𝑡−1
2
 
Operating Accruals ACC 
(𝐼𝐵 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂)
𝑆
 
Percent Change in Sales ∆S 
(𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑡−1
 
Negative Percent Change in Sales N_∆S 
When ∆S is negative, so N_∆S is equal to: 
(𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑡−1
 
When ∆S is positive, so N_∆S is equal to 0 
Note: S: sales; COGS: cost of goods sold, SGA: selling, general, and administrative expenses; OA: operating assets (total assets 
less cash and short-term investments); OL: operating liabilities (total assets less total debt, less book value of common and 
preferred equity, less minority interests); IB: net income before extraordinary items; CFO: cash flows from operations. 
Table 1. Measurement of the unexpected change in core earnings 
Source: McVay (2006). 
 
 
In order to verify if managers engage in earnings management by classification shifting, it is 
analyzed the relationship between unexpected change in core earnings (UE) and income-decreasing 
special items (IDSI), according to Equation 2. If income-decreasing special items (IDSI) presents a 
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positive relationship with unexpected change in core earnings (UE), so the managers engage in earnings 
management classification shifting, transferring items from core earnings to special items (McVay, 2006). 
 
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
The present study seeks to analyze the effect of corporate governance in the earnings management 
by classification shifting. To that end, corporate governance (CG) is measured through the differentiated 
levels of corporate governance of B3, so companies at one of these levels would tend to engage less in 
earnings management. Equation 3 demonstrates the model that seeks to reject or not the research 
hypothesis. 
 
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
 
Income-decreasing special items (IDSI) are expected to be positively related to the unexpected 
change in core earnings (UE). This relationship shows that managers engage in earnings management by 
classification shifting. In turn, it is expected that the interaction between IDSI and corporate governance 
(CG) presents a negative relation with UE. Thus, companies listed in differentiated levels of corporate 
governance would present controls that would restrict the earnings management by classification shifting 
by managers. As control variables, we used size (SIZE), growth (GROW), return on assets (ROA), 
leverage (LEV), market-to-book (MTB) and IFRS adoption (IFRS). Table 2 presents the description of 
the variables of Equation 3. 
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Variables Measurement 
Unexpected change in core earnings UE Difference between CE and the residual (𝜀𝑖𝑡) in Equation 1 
Income-decreasing special items IDSI 
When Special Items (SI) is negative, so IDSI is equal to: 
(𝑆𝐼 ∗ (−1))
𝑆
 
When SI is positive, so IDSI is equal to 0 
Corporate Governance DLCG 
It is represented by two dummies variables: 
(1) NM: it is 1 when firms are listed in New Market segment of 
B3 and 0, otherwise 
(2) DLCG: it is 1 when firms are listed in Differentiated Levels 
of Corporate Governance (Level 1, Level 2 and New Market) and 
0, otherwise 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
Growth GROW Change in Sales 
Return on Assets ROA Net Income before Extraordinary Items divided by Total Assets 
Leverage LEV Total Debts divided by Total Assets 
Market-to-Book MTB Market Value of Equity divided by the Book Value of Equity 
IFRS adoption IFRS 
Dummy variable, which is 1 between 2010 and 2016, and 0, 
otherwise. 
Table 2. Dependent, independent and control variables 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
For robustness analysis, we observe the effect of corporate governance on other earnings 
management metrics, so we used manipulation by accruals (Dechow & Dichev, 2002) and manipulation 
by operational activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). The manipulation by accruals or accruals quality is 
measured according to Equation 4. 
 
Δ𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
The accruals quality (AQ) represents the residual (𝜀𝑖𝑡) of Equation 4, in which, the higher the 
residual value, the lower is the accruals quality.  
In turn, the manipulation by operational activities (MOA) is composed of three attributes. The first 
proxy is the sales manipulation (SM) that is measured by Equation 5. 
 
CFO𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽11/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ΔS𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
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The sales manipulation (SM) represents the residuals (εit) of Equation 5 multiplied by -1, in which, 
the higher the value of the residuals, the greater is the manipulation by operational activities, considering 
SM.  
The second proxy is the reduction of discretionary expenditure (RDE), which is calculated by 
Equation 6. 
 
DISE𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽11/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (6) 
 
The reduction of discretionary expenses (RDE) represents the residuals (εit) of Equation 6 
multiplied by -1, in which, the higher the value of the residuals, the greater is the manipulation by 
operational activities, considering RDE.  
The third proxy is the overproduction (OP), which is determined by Equation 7. 
 
PROD𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽11/𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3ΔS𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4ΔS𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
 
Overproduction (OP) represents the residuals (εit) of Equation 7, in which, the higher the value of 
the residuals, the greater is the manipulation by operational activities, considering the OP.  
According to Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), the sum of SM, RDE and OP was calculated, which 
would represent a more comprehensive variable of manipulation by operational activity (MOA). Table 3 
presents the variables used to measure the earnings management models, which considers manipulation 
by accruals and by operational activities. 
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Variáveis Operacionalização 
Change in Working Capital ∆WC 
(∆RECT +  ∆INVT – ∆AP – ∆TXP +  ∆OA)
𝐴𝑡−1
 
Cash Flows from Operations CFO 
(CFO)
𝐴𝑡−1
 
Change in Sales ∆S 
(𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡−1)
𝐴𝑡−1
 
Discretionary Expenses DISE 
(XRD + XAD + XSGA)
𝐴𝑇𝑡−1
 
Production costs PROD 
(COGS + ∆INVT)
𝐴𝑡−1
 
Note: ∆RECT: change in receivables; ∆INV: change in inventories; ∆AP: change in accounts payable; ∆TXP: change in income 
taxes payable; ∆AO: change in other assets; A: total assets; S: sales; XRD: research and development expense; XAD: 
Advertising Expense; XSGA: selling, general and administrative expense; COGS: cost of goods sold. While XSGA has 
available value, XRD and XAD will be 0 if there is a missing value. 
Table 3. Variables of alternative earnings management models 
Source: Dechow and Dichev (2002), Roychowdhury (2006). 
 
Thus, Equation 8 presents the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and earnings 
management (EM). 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (8) 
 
Earnings management (EM) consists of AQ, SM, RDE, OP and MOA. Differentiated levels of 
corporate governance (GC) are expected to be negatively related to earnings management metrics. It is 
emphasized that all the variables described in Tables 1, 2 and 3 went through the winsorization process. 
In addition, OLS regressions by industry and year were estimated for Equations 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, according 
to McVay (2006), Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Roychowdhury (2006), for Equations 2, 3 and 8 were 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests and the Hausman test to verify that estimation (POLS, 
random effects or fixed effects) is the best fit, showing the random effects to the most appropriate 
estimation for the data structure. 
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Analysis of Results and Discussion 
Relationship between corporate governance and classification shifting 
This section contains the description and analysis of the data. Initially, the descriptive analysis of 
the data in the period between 2005 and 2016 of the companies listed in B3 is presented. Information 
about the unexpected change in core earnings, income-decreasing special items, size, growth, profitability, 
leverage, and market-to-book are described in Table 4. 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation 
UE -2.2204 1.9465 0.0072 0.1961 -27.2361 
IDSI 0.0000 0.5102 0.0105 0.0359 3.4190 
SIZE 2.4505 13.7103 7.4613 1.8463 0.2475 
GROW -0.9726 5.3390 0.1386 0.4298 3.1010 
ROA -0.7960 0.7185 0.0669 0.0983 1.4694 
LEV 0.0000 4.5517 0.3331 0.3481 1.0450 
MTB -126.0603 137.3871 1.8287 8.1969 4.4824 
Note: UE: Unexpected Change in Core Earnings; IDSI: Income-Decreasing Special Items; SIZE: Firm Size; GROW: Change 
in Sales; ROA: Return on Assets; LEV: Leverage; MTB: Market-to-Book.  
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Based on Table 4, the unexpected change in core earnings (UE) and the income-decreasing special 
items (IDSI) presented a mean of -0.72% and 1.05%, respectively. Also, they have coefficients of variation 
of 26.9% and 3.42%. The results indicate that companies suddenly change the classification of core 
expenses for special items, and in general, companies would be engaging in earnings management by 
classification shifting, this result is consistent with McVay (2006). 
Additionally, among the control variables, the market-to-book (MTB) shows a higher level of 
variability, indicating a strong valuation of the companies listed in B3, with a coefficient of variation of 
448.2%, followed by profitability (ROA) with a variation of 146.9%. 
Table 5 presents the correlation analysis of the variables of earnings management, corporate 
governance and control variables. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
UE 1.000                 
IDSI 0.010  1.000               
NM -0.003  0.010  1.000             
DLCG 0.030  0.066 *** 0.714 *** 1.000           
SIZE 0.067 *** 0.126 *** 0.186 *** 0.457 *** 1.000         
GROW 0.113 *** -0.050 *** 0.133 *** 0.118 *** 0.089 *** 1.000       
ROA 0.320 *** -0.111 *** 0.125 *** 0.152 *** 0.150 *** 0.125 *** 1.000     
LEV -0.023  0.021  -0.026  -0.046 ** -0.023  -0.038 * -0.035  1.000   
MTB 0.018  -0.041 * 0.102 *** 0.085 *** 0.039 * 0.016  0.141 *** -0.069 *** 1.000  
IFRS -0.020  0.089 *** 0.051 ** 0.033  0.144 *** -0.042 * -0.115 *** -0.013  -0.006  1,000 
Note: UE: Unexpected Change in Core Earnings; IDSI: Income-Decreasing Special Items; NM: New Market level; DLCG: 
Differentiated Levels of Corporate Governance (Level 1, Level 2 and New Market); SIZE: Firm Size; GROW: Change in Sales; 
ROA: Return on Assets; LEV: Leverage; MTB: Market-to-Book; IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards . *** 
significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
The results indicate that the UE variable has a positive correlation with size, growth and 
profitability (ROA), at a significant at the 1% level. The IDSI variable, in turn, shows a positive correlation 
with the differentiated levels of corporate governance, firm size and IFRS adoption, while pointing out a 
negative correlation with the firm's growth and profitability (ROA). 
Firm size, growth and profitability are shown to be correlated with all study variables. On the other 
hand, leverage is negatively correlated with the differentiated levels of corporate governance and firm 
growth, indicating an inverse relationship between the variables. 
Table 6 presents the relationship between the differentiated levels of corporate governance and the 
earnings management by classification shifting through regressions with robust errors and random effects. 
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Variables Expected Sign 
General NM DLCG 
Modelo (a) Modelo (b) Modelo (c) Modelo (d) Modelo (e) 
IDSI + 0.2611 ** 0.2613 ** 0.5148 *** 0.2621 *** 0.6876 *** 
  (0.1257)  (0.1257)  (0.1631)  (0.1258)  (0.2053)  
CG –  -0.0201  -0.013  -0.0103  -0.0036  
   (0.0241)  (0.0243)  (0.0256)  (0.0258)  
IDSI*CG –    -0.6158 **   -0.6760 *** 
     (0.2528)   (0.2581)  
SIZE ? 0.0019  0.0029  0.0025  0.0030  0.0030  
  (0.0057 ) (0.0058)  (0.0058)  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  
GROW ? 0.0352 *** 0.0356 *** 0.0349 *** 0.0353 *** 0.0343 *** 
  (0.0101 ) (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0101)  
ROA ? 0.8117 *** 0.8139 *** 0.8154 *** 0.8129 *** 0.8124 *** 
  (0.0569 ) (0.0570)  (0.0570)  (0.0570)  (0.0570)  
LEV ? 0.0071  0.0068  0.0069  0.0068  0.0055  
  (0.0185 ) (0.0185)  (0.0185)  (0.0185)  (0.0185)  
MTB ? -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  
  (0.0005 ) (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  
IFRS ? 0.0147  0.0144  0.0146  0.0141  0.0141  
  (0.0096 ) (0.0096)  (0.0096)  (0.0097)  (0.0097)  
Intercept  -0.1013 ** -0.1002 ** -0.1008 ** -0.1033 ** -0.1065 ** 
  (0.0423 ) (0.0424)  (0.0424)  (0.0426)  (0.0427)  
N (Obs.)  1868  1868  1868  1868  1868  
2  243.2746 *** 243.9124 *** 250.4497 *** 243.3086 *** 250.9015 *** 
R2 overall  0.1100  0.1127  0.1138  0.1109  0.1125  
R2 within  0.1113  0.1113  0.1147  0.1114  0.1151  
R2 between  0.1683  0.1685  0.1672  0.1669  0.1662  
Model (a): 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Models (b) and (d): 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Models (c) and (e): 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Note: UE: Unexpected Change in Core Earnings; IDSI: Income-Decreasing Special Items; NM: New Market level; DLCG: 
Differentiated Levels of Corporate Governance (Level 1, Level 2 and New Market); SIZE: Firm Size; GROW: Change in Sales; 
ROA: Return on Assets; LEV: Leverage; MTB: Market-to-Book; IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards. Values 
in parentheses indicate the robust error term. *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 
10% level. 
Table 6. Regression of Earnings Management by Classification Shifting 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
All models proposed were significant at a significance level of 1%, with a mean explanatory power 
of 11.23%. Although R2 has shown little representativeness, previous studies have shown close 
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explanatory levels (Chen et al., 2007; González & García-Meca, 2014; Iqbal & Strong, 2010; Martinez, 
2011). 
As expected, the coefficients of the income-decreasing special items (IDSI) were significant and 
positive in all proposed models. This indicates that companies listed in Brazil manage their earnings by 
classification shifting, not implying a change in the net income. These results show that managers inflate 
the core earnings by moving opportunistically from core expenditures to sporadic expenditures such as 
special items (McVay, 2006), discontinued operations (Barua et al., 2010) and tax expenditures 
(Robinson, 2010). 
The IDSI coefficients in models (c) and (e) become more representative, when the interactive 
variable between corporate governance and special items is considered, thus, corporate governance 
through differentiated levels of B3 is relevant. 
In order to evaluate the effect of governance on earnings management by classification shifting, it 
is necessary to observe the interactive variable, since in this type of earnings management the relationship 
between the unexpected change in core earnings and the special items is analyzed. Thus, the findings show 
that earnings management is negatively influenced by firms listed in the differentiated levels of corporate 
governance. This result does not reject the hypothesis of the research (H1). 
The negative relationship between corporate governance and earnings management was also found 
in British firms (Iqbal & Strong, 2010, Zalata & Roberts, 2015), Indonesian firms (Siregar and Utama, 
2008), Chilean firms (Iturriaga & Hoffman, 2005), East Asia firms (Haw et al., 2011) and Latin America 
firms (Gonzalez &García-Meca, 2014). In Brazil, evidence is aligned with previous studies (Barros et al., 
2013; Cunha & Piccoli, 2017). However, in Brazil, there is no evidence of the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management by classification shifting. Thus, based on the findings, 
the hypothesis H1. 
Hence, firms listed in differentiated levels of corporate governance tend to manage less earnings 
by classification shifting, where the core expenses are moved to special items, not implying a change in 
net income (McVay, 2006). As a consequence, the accounting information quality presented by listed 
firms in differentiated levels of corporate governance in the financial statements would be greater, 
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indicating that investors and stakeholders, in general, can make more precise decisions, showing reliability 
of the accounting numbers. 
Additionally, profitability (ROA) and growth (GROW) directly affect the earnings management 
by classification shifting (McVay, 2006). Zalata and Roberts (2015, 2017) found that profitability, 
measured by ROA, influences, in fact, the earnings management by classification shifting. This result may 
suggest that firms with strong performance, although they may be less interested in managing earnings 
based on accruals, they could be more likely to be involved in manipulation by classification shifting. 
Mazzioni et al. (2015) has found evidence that business performance is able to positively influence 
the earnings management by accruals. Thus, both type of earnings management - accruals and 
classification shifting - have a positive influence on business performance. 
 
Robustness analysis 
For robustness analysis, regression analysis was performed estimating the effect of differentiated 
levels of corporate governance (NM and DLCG) on earnings management by accruals (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002) and by manipulation of operational activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). The results are in Table 7. 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
SM RDE OP MOA AQ 
NM DLCG NM DLCG NM DLCG NM DLCG NM DLCG 
CG ? 0.003 -0.011 -0.031† -0.031† -0.050* -0.056* -0.072† -0.101* 0.047* 0.045* 
  0.012 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.036 0.037 0.010 0.011 
SIZE ? 0.002 0.004 0.018* 0.018* 0.014* 0.016* 0.037* 0.041* -0.003 -0.007† 
  0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.003 
GROW ? 0.016* 0.011† 0.000 0.000 0.034* 0.035* 0.051* 0.050* 0.134* 0.137* 
  0.006 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.012 
ROA ? -0.319* -0.323* 0.197* 0.183* -0.472* -0.470* -0.564* -0.564* 0.080 0.091‡ 
  0.030 0.029 0.016 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.057 0.057 0.049 0.048 
LEV ? 0.019 0.027‡ 0.012 -0.003 0.008 0.012 0.051‡ 0.049‡ -0.020 -0.014 
  0.013 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.016 0.028 0.026 0.019 0.018 
MTB ? -0.003* 0.000 0.000 0.000† 0.000 0.000 -0.001† 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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IFRS ? 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.013* 0.012† 0.017 0.012 -0.047* -0.044* 
  0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Intercept  -0.006 -0.013 -0.136* -0.133* -0.070* -0.074* -0.240* -0.246* -0.054* -0.040‡ 
  0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027 0.055 0.054 0.021 0.021 
N (Obs.)  1924 1958 2003 2090 1978 1976 1938 1960 1843 1867 
2  166.03* 151.26* 221.73* 206.95* 388.45* 391.87* 182.88* 174.77* 205.71* 205.18* 
R2 overall  0.173 0.163 0.049 0.055 0.196 0.202 0.118 0.115 0.101 0.099 
R2 within  0.061 0.050 0.105 0.094 0.160 0.162 0.084 0.078 0.085 0.085 
R2 between  0.153 0.213 0.076 0.071 0.201 0.203 0.098 0.101 0.199 0.168 
Models: 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + Σ𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Note: SM: Sales Manipulation; RDE: Reduction of Discretionary Expenditure; OP: Overproduction; MOA: Manipulation by 
Operational Activities; AQ: Accruals quality; NM: New Market level; DLCG: Differentiated Levels of Corporate Governance 
(Level 1, Level 2 and New Market); SIZE: Firm Size; GROW: Change in Sales; ROA: Return on Assets; LEV: Leverage; 
MTB: Market-to-Book; IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards. Values in parentheses indicate the robust error 
term. * significant at the 1% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7. Regression of other types of earnings management 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
Similar to the findings shown in Table 6, all models were significant at 1% level, with mean R2 of 
12.7% for both groups (NM and DLCG), with a minimum of 4.9% and a maximum of 20.2%.  
Firms listed in differentiated levels of corporate governance (DLCG) may, in fact, influence the 
earnings management in different ways. The manipulation by operational activities - reduction of 
discretionary expenditure, overproduction and the comprehensive measure of manipulation by operational 
activities - is negatively influenced by corporate governance. This result is in line with the evidence 
pointed out in Table 6. On the other hand, corporate governance positively affects the earnings 
management by accruals. 
As demonstrated by Martinez (2011), Erfurth and Bezerra (2013) and Mazzioni et al. (2015), the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management presents inconsistencies in a Latin 
American context. It was expected that the earnings management by accruals and operational activities 
would be the same as those observed in earnings management classification shifting. The possible 
justification lies in the metrics and in the definition of earnings management, however classification 
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shifting, manipulation of operational activities and manipulation by accruals refer to earnings 
management, each one has a different focus. 
 
Conclusion 
This study aims to verify the influence of corporate governance in the earnings management by 
classification shifting in the firms listed in B3. The sample comprises 236 firms during the period between 
2005 and 2016. To measure the earnings management, the McVay (2006) model was used, while the 
differentiated levels of governance of B3 were used as metric of corporate governance. The findings 
indicated that earnings management is influenced by corporate governance. 
Initially, the results shown that Brazilian companies manage their earnings by classification 
shifting, indicating that the core earnings are being transferred to the special items (McVay, 2006), but 
can also be used as discontinued operations and tax expenditure (Barua et al., 2010; Robinson, 2010), 
overshadowing the real operating income. 
Earnings management, measured by classification shifting (McVay, 2006), indicated negative 
relationship with corporate governance. Thus, the hypothesis H1 - corporate governance negatively 
influences the earnings management – is not rejected. As reported by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), corporate governance is able to minimize agency conflicts arising from the existence of 
informational asymmetry as well as earnings management. 
Corporate governance literature shows that strong corporate governance improves the monitoring 
of managerial discretion over accounting choices. However, most of these studies have investigated the 
role of governance in a highly regulated environment through accounting standards such as the treatment 
of accruals. In addition, few studies have been conducted in markets based on IFRS. 
In the robustness analysis, the earnings management by operational activities (Roychowdhury, 
2006) also showed similar result. These findings are convergent with national and international evidence 
(Barros et al., 2013; Cunha & Piccoli, 2017; González & García-Meca, 2014; Haw et al., 2011; Iturriaga 
& Hoffman, 2005; Iqbal & Strong, 2010; Siregar & Utama, 2008; Zalata & Roberts, 2015). 
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The main contribution of this paper is that, in Brazilian context, there is no previous studies that 
analyzed earnings management by classification shifting, and it was found similar results to international 
evidence. In Brazil, some studies have analyzed the relationship between earnings management and 
corporate governance under the use of other type of earnings management (Barros et al., 2013; Cunha & 
Piccoli, 2017 & Martinez, 2011). The result of this paper reinforces that the practice of earnings 
management can be reduced when firms have the best practices of corporate governance. 
Therefore, these findings are relevant for B3 and investors, because it demonstrates that efforts 
made by B3, to ensure that firms adopt best practices of corporate governance and respond to the interests 
of majority and minority shareholders, is able to alter the opportunistic behavior of managers, thus 
increasing, the quality of accounting information. It should be emphasized that this effect can be due to 
the specific objectives of corporate governance, based on the principles that govern it (IBGC, 2014), 
motivations related to the capital market and motivations arising from the agreements between firms and 
stakeholders (Healy & Whalen, 1998). 
As a limitation, it is pointed out the metrics of corporate governance. Regarding the corporate 
governance metrics, only the differentiated levels of corporate governance of B3 were used, and corporate 
governance does not have a broadly defined concept and metric. 
As demonstrated by the robustness analysis, there is a difference between the metrics of earnings 
management with corporate governance, thus, for future research, it is suggested an analysis that identifies, 
for example, the existence of differences in the effect of corporate governance on earnings management – 
by accruals, operational activities and classification shifting –, trying to identify and explain the existence 
of different relationships. Use other more robust corporate governance measures to verify whether the 
relationship is consistent with the literature, seeking to confirm whether or not market measures are 
reliable for investors to use. In addition, it is suggested to increase the sample of research and observe 
factors such as national culture and legal system that, along with corporate governance, can affect the 
earnings management. 
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